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Abstract
Recent evidence for an evolved fear module in the brain comes from studies showing that adults, children and infants detect evolutionarily
threatening stimuli such as snakes faster than non-threatening ones. A decisive argument for a threat detection system efficient early in life
would come from data showing, in young infants, a functional threat-detection mechanism in terms of “what” and “where” visual pathways.
The present study used a variant of Posner’s cuing paradigm, adapted to 7–11-month-olds. On each trial, a threat-irrelevant or a threat-
relevant cue was presented (a flower or a snake, i.e., “what”). We measured how fast infants detected these cues and the extent to which
they further influenced the spatial allocation of attention (“where”). In line with previous findings, we observed that infants oriented faster
towards snake than flower cues. Importantly, a facilitation effect was found at the cued location for flowers but not for snakes, suggesting
that these latter cues elicit a broadening of attention and arguing in favour of sophisticated “what–where” connections. These results
strongly support the claim that humans have an early propensity to detect evolutionarily threat-relevant stimuli.
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Snakes and primates co-exist for millions of years, with snakes
being the first of the major predators of primates (Isbell, 2006,
2009). Effective processes of snake detection may have thus been
fostered through natural selection in primates as such ability would
allow a better defensive behaviour. A fear module could have
evolved in mammals’ brain to assist them in responding adequately
to recurrent survival threat (O¨hman & Mineka, 2003), in particular
to threats represented by reptiles, of which snakes are a prototypical
exemplar. Going one step further, it has been suggested that this
evolutionary ancient predator–prey relationship played a significant
role in the evolution of the primates’ visual system. The Snake
Detection Theory posits that the vital need to rapidly detect snakes
shaped primates’ brain such that they developed acute perceptual
abilities (Isbell, 2006, 2009).
Recent studies have consistently demonstrated that humans are
remarkable snake detectors. Using a visual search task, O¨hman,
Flykt, and Esteves (2001) were the first to report that adults are
faster to detect a picture of a snake in an array of flower pictures
than vice versa, supporting the claim that snakes capture attentional
resources. This finding has been replicated many times (e.g., Lipp,
Derakshan, Waters, & Logies, 2004; LoBue & Mathews, 2014;
LoBue, Mathews, Harvey, & Stark, 2014; Soares, Lindstro¨m,
Esteves, & O¨hman, 2014), and extended to young children who
in all likelihood have at the very most little experience and knowl-
edge about the dangerousness of snakes (Hayakawa, Kawai, &
Masataka, 2011; LoBue & DeLoache, 2008, 2011; Masataka,
Hayakawa, & Kawai, 2010; Penkunas & Coss, 2013a, 2013b).
Although preschool children are admittedly less experienced with
snakes than adults, a stronger and more decisive argument for an
inborn threat (and snakes in particular) detection system would
come from infants and lab-reared monkeys. A few recent studies
point in that direction.
Lab-reared macaque monkeys with no prior experience with
snakes have the same propensity as humans to faster detect a
snake among flowers than a flower among snakes (Shibasaki &
Kawai, 2009). Crucially, Van Le et al. (2013) recently reported
that pulvinar neurons in the macaque brain respond selectively
to images of snakes, supporting the existence of a neurobiolo-
gical substrate for the rapid detection of snakes in primates. In
order to investigate the predisposition to rapidly detect snakes in
human infants, in two recent studies, 7–18-month-olds were
presented with pairs of pictures, one threat-relevant (e.g., a
snake) and the other threat-irrelevant (e.g., a flower), shown
side by side (DeLoache & LoBue, 2009; LoBue & DeLoache,
2010). Supporting the claim that human infants detect snakes
rapidly, infants turned faster toward the snake than the threat-
irrelevant picture of the pair. These results provide a first sup-
port for the existence of an attentional bias toward snakes in
infancy. Together with the findings in lab-reared macaque mon-
keys, they strongly suggest that enhanced visual detection of
snakes would not depend on prior experience with these
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animals, and support the existence of an inborn mechanism for
the rapid detection of an evolutionary threat.
The underlying explanation for these detection mechanisms is
that primates would have evolved visual templates for recognizing
threatening animals such as snakes and spiders (Rakison &
Derringer, 2008). These templates would integrate low-level fea-
tures and forms of these threatening animals, and attract infants’
attention to their real-world counterparts. While the critical low-
level perceptual feature for detecting snakes would be their curvi-
linear and coiled shape (LoBue, 2014; LoBue & DeLoache, 2011),
the oval body connected to curved legs characteristic of spiders
would be crucial for rapidly detecting these arachnids (Rakison &
Derringer, 2008). Interestingly, it has been recently suggested that
humans would also have evolved auditory templates to rapidly
detect threats signalled by sound features (Erlich, Lipp, & Slaugh-
ter, 2013). The evolved predisposition to detect threat would thus
not be limited to the visual modality.
Importantly, while human infants would detect snakes particu-
larly rapidly, they would not innately fear them. Several studies
using behavioural and physiological measures demonstrated that
infants do not show actual fear when exposed to movies displaying
snakes in motion (DeLoache & LoBue, 2009; Thrasher & LoBue,
2016). Nevertheless, humans, and more generally primates, would
be prepared to develop responses of fear towards snakes (DeLoache
& LoBue, 2009; O¨hman & Mineka, 2001, 2003). In fact, the detec-
tion bias towards snakes in primates would facilitate learning of an
association between the presence of a snake and a fearful reaction
(O¨hman & Mineka, 2001, 2003; Rakison & Derringer, 2008).
To be fully functional, threat detection would bear on the two
parallel streams of processing composing the visual system: the
“what” and the “where” subsystems (Milner & Goodale, 1995).
The “what” subsystem is involved in the recognition and identi-
fication of visual objects. Also referred to as the “ventral stream”,
it extends from the primary visual cortex (V1) to portions of the
temporal cortex. The “where” subsystem subtends the processing
and attending to the objects’ spatial location. This is also called
the “dorsal stream”, and it projects from V1 to regions of the
parietal cortex. Both subsystems develop early in life, although
different aspects emerge at different ages (Johnson, Mareschal, &
Csibra, 2008).
Evidence for an early development of the “what” visual pathway
comes, for instance, from face processing studies: newborns look
longer at face-like than non-face-like stimuli (Johnson, Dziurawiec,
Ellis, & Morton, 1991), and at their mother’s face than at another
woman’s (Bushneil, Sai, &Mullin, 1989). Infants’ faster processing
of a snake than of a non-threatening picture (DeLoache & LoBue,
2009; LoBue & DeLoache, 2010) also supports the functionality of
the “what” visual pathway.
Regarding the “where” pathway, many studies using spatial
cuing paradigms have documented infants’ ability to shift attention
from one location to another from birth onwards (Valenza, Simion,
& Umilta`, 1994). Cuing of visual attention seems effective by 4
months of age, with infants (like adults) showing both facilitation
and inhibition of response to a cued spatial location depending on
the Stimulus Onset Asynchrony (SOA, Johnson, 1994). Timing
parameters and the distribution of attention across the visual field
(linked to cue/target eccentricity) are nevertheless highly decisive
in eliciting such shifts. Their influence depends on the infant’s age
(Harman, Posner, Rothbart, & Thomas-Thrapp, 1994; Johnson &
Tucker, 1996). In fact, the ability to orient attention in the visual
space develops in the first year of life, in parallel with the ability to
program eye movements (Harman et al., 1994; Johnson, 1994). In
particular, the preference for novel, uncued locations develops
between 3 and 6 months of age (Harman et al., 1994) and depends
on the target eccentricity: while 3-month-olds demonstrate such a
preference only for short target eccentricities, 6-month-olds, who
are better able to program eye movements, orient their attention
preferentially to uncued locations also at higher target eccentricities
(Clohessy, Posner, Rothbart, & Vecera, 1991).
Some degree of integration between both subsystems are
already present in early infancy (Johnson et al., 2008). Coherently,
the two pathways are richly interconnected in the developing brain
(Stiles, Paul, & Ark, 2008). The existence of an early functional
link between them is supported by recent studies demonstrating that
social cues affect the orientation of spatial attention. For instance,
the direction of an adult’s eye gaze can bias 4-month-old infants’
attention towards the corresponding location, and cause enhanced
processing of any object presented thereon (Reid, Striano,
Kaufman, & Johnson, 2004). Threat-relevant facial expressions
have also been found to hamper infants’ attentional disengagement
processes (Peltola, Leppanen, Palokangas, & Hietanen, 2008).
In the present study, we wanted to establish further the existence
of a threat-dependent functional link between the “what” and
“where” subsystems. Specifically, we examined whether the detec-
tion of unfamiliar, non-social threat-relevant stimuli like snakes
(whose processing bears on the “what” subsystem) at specific loca-
tions modulates the subsequent processing of stimuli appearing
either at the same or different locations (those processes belong
to the “where” subsystem). As argued elsewhere (Bertels, Kolinsky,
& Morais, 2010), an effective interaction between subsystems
would improve the ecological adaptation of any organism. Threat
detection would modulate the orientation of attention towards the
relevant locations in the environment and therefore foster proper
reactions to the to-be-attended stimuli. The existence of such a
functional link was investigated in infants from 7 months old, since
snake detection biases have been documented from this age on
(DeLoache & LoBue, 2009; LoBue & DeLoache, 2010). Moreover,
at this age infants’ attentional orienting abilities are well devel-
opped (Johnson, 1994).
We used the spatial cuing paradigm in which, originally, a per-
ipheral cue is followed by a target presented either in the same or in
another, opposite location (Posner, 1980). This paradigm has been
widely used to study attentional orienting. Attention allocation
might indeed be inferred based on response latencies to targets
presented at cued or uncued locations. We adapted the paradigm
in two ways. First, the cue may have a threat-related content, to
examine whether cue facilitation effects (i.e., faster responses to
targets presented at the same location as the preceding cue than at
the opposite location) are modulated by the nature of the cue (Stor-
mark, Nordby, & Hugdahl, 1995). In the present study, cues were
presented peripherally and consisted of pictures of either snakes (in
threat-relevant trials) or flowers (in threat-irrelevant trials).
Second, we adapted the task to infants so as to study their
attentional shifts through saccades in response to a stimulus (Clo-
hessy et al., 1991). In each trial, we presented a central attention
getter (a blinking star) between the cue and the target in order to
reorient their attention to the centre of the screen. We also used a
bilateral target (two checkerboard patterns, one on the left and one
on the right) to be able to record (1) the latency of the first saccade
following the targets’ presentation and (2) the direction of the first
saccade, depending on the location and nature of the preceding cue.
Cue facilitation effects could then result in faster saccades and more
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first looks oriented toward the cued than toward the uncued
target location.
We had two main predictions derived from the “what–where”
connection hypothesis. First, in line with previous studies suggest-
ing that infants preferentially allocate their attention to threat-
relevant than to threat-irrelevant stimuli (DeLoache & LoBue,
2009; LoBue & DeLoache, 2010), we expected faster orienting
towards snake than flower cue locations. First looks should then
be faster when directed towards snake than towards flower cues.
Second, we predicted that the presentation of a snake vs. a flower
would modulate cue facilitation effects. Specifically, we expected
facilitation effects when threat-irrelevant flower cues were pre-
sented, namely faster and more frequent first looks toward the
cued than toward the uncued target. In contrast, the presentation
of snake cues might result in two different types of cuing effects.
First, facilitation effects observed with flower cues may be can-
celled, if not reversed, after a snake cue. Indeed, from an evolu-
tionary point of view, it would not be adaptive for infants’
attention, after having been disengaged from the snake location,
to keep on shifting back to that location. Rather, new locations
should be explored to detect the presence of additional danger and
consider escaping. Such an abolition of cuing effects by threaten-
ing stimuli has been observed previously in adults (Bertels,
Kolinsky, Bernaerts, & Morais, 2011). Another possibility is that
facilitation effects would be enhanced when a snake cue is pre-
sented. Looking back at the snake location would indeed be rel-
evant as to monitor the snake. Preferential processing of targets
appearing at previous snake locations has been reported before,
but only when attention was not driven back to a central location
before the onset of the target (Lipp & Derakshan, 2005).
Method
Participants
Nineteen 7–11-month-old healthy full term infants1 (5 boys)
with no prior experience of snakes made up the final sample
(mean age ¼ 284 days, range ¼ 223–361). Three additional
infants were excluded from the study due to a looking bias:
their first gaze was directed towards the left (n ¼ 2) or right
target (n ¼ 1) on every trial.
Apparatus
Stimulus presentation and timing were controlled using the Psy-
chophysics Toolbox software (Brainard, 1997). Stimuli were pre-
sented through a 55’’ LCD digital TV screen. Infants’ looking
behaviour was monitored with a video camera located above the
screen. Infants’ looking behaviour as well as the specific experi-
mental display presented to each participant were recorded
and synchronized for off-line analyses by Media Recorder 2.5
(Noldus, The Netherlands).
Stimuli and procedure
Each infant was tested individually while seated on the parent’s lap
100 cm from the TV screen, in a separate 3-sided enclosure of a
dimly lit room.
Each trial began with the presentation of an attention getter on
the centre of the screen, consisting of a blinking star (20.3 
22.8 cm) accompanied by an attractive sound (Figure 1). Once the
infant’s attention focused on the star, the experimenter initiated the
presentation of the cue. The cue consisted of one amongst eight
brightly coloured pictures of snakes and flowers in their natural
background used in a previous study (LoBue & DeLoache, 2008)
for 400 ms, peripherally presented on the left or right with the same
likelihood, at an eccentricity of 30 visual angle. Each cue mea-
sured 29.9  22.8 cm. The duration and the eccentricity of the cues
were chosen as to foster eye movements towards their location (i.e.,
overt attentional orienting, see e.g., Clohessy et al., 1991). Then, the
central blinking star was presented again for 1200 ms,2 silently. It
aimed at reorienting the infant’s attention to the centre of the screen
before the 2000-ms presentation of the bilateral target consisting of
two checkerboard patterns (one on the left and one on the right, both
measuring 29.9  22.8 cm and presented at 30) flickering by
alternating their contrast polarity at a 10-Hz frequency.
Each infant was presented with four 8-trial blocks. In each
block, a different cue (either a snake or a flower) was presented
on every trial, which resulted in four threat-relevant and four threat-
irrelevant trials, half on the left and half on the right (counter-
balanced across cue types). Trials were randomly presented.
Coding
Looking times for each infant were coded frame-by-frame (i.e.,
25 ms intervals) by a graduate student trained by the first author,
using The Observer XT11 (Noldus, The Netherlands). Coding was
blind since it was made separately on videos of the infant’s face
and on videos of the experimental display he/she was presented
with. The videos of the infant’s face and of the experimental
display were synchronized after the coding. The first author inde-
pendently coded about 10% of the data. Inter-coder reliability was
96%.
Three variables of interest, corresponding to three different
looking-behaviours occurring in sequence, were measured: (1) the
latency to look at the cue, namely the amount of time from the onset
of the cue to the infant’s first look toward the cue;3 (2) the latency to
look at the target, namely the amount of time from the onset of the
Figure 1. Time course of a trial. Each trial begins with the presentation of
an attention-getter (a centrally presented blinking star accompanied by an
attractive sound). Once the infant is looking at it, a cue is presented for
400 ms, either on the right (as depicted here) or on the left of the screen.
The cue is either a picture of a flower (threat-irrelevant trials) or a snake
(threat-relevant trials). The central blinking star is presented again for
1200 ms and followed by the bilateral target, consisting of two
checkerboard patterns (one on the left and one on the right of the screen)
flickering at a 10-Hz frequency.
Bertels et al. 3
bilateral target to the infant’s first look toward one of the target; and
(3) the percentage of first gaze oriented toward the “cued” over the
“uncued” target, namely the proportion of trials in which infants
looked first at the target presented at the cue location.
In each trial, each variable of interest was measured only if
the prior variables of interest could also be measured within the
same trial.
Results
Latencies to look at the cue
Trials in which infants did not look at the cue were not considered
in the following analysis (68 trials out of 608, i.e., 11.18% of the
data). Out of the 540 remaining data points, five were identified as
outliers (i.e., they were more than three standard deviations above
the overall mean latency) and removed from the analysis.
In accordance with our prediction that snake pictures would
improve attentional capture, a paired-sample t test on the latencies
to look at the cue revealed that infants oriented their gaze faster
towards snake than flower cues, t(18) ¼ 2.57, p ¼ .019, Cohen’s
d ¼ .59 (for snake cues: M ¼ 284 ms, SD ¼ 53, for flower cues:
M ¼ 304 ms, SD ¼ 51).
The average latency difference did not correlate with age,
r ¼ .264, p > .10.
Latencies to look at the target
Trials in which infants did not look at the cue (see prior analysis),
did not look back at the subsequent central star, were not looking at
the central star at the onset of the target, and trials in which eye
movements were not made directly towards a target were not con-
sidered in the two following analyses (together, 128 trials out of
608, i.e., 21.05% of the data). Out of the 474 remaining data points,
seven were identified as outliers and removed from the analyses.
Table 1 displays the mean latencies of the first looks at the cued
and the uncued targets as a function of the preceding cue.
A 2 (Cue: flower vs. snake)  2 (Gaze direction: cued vs.
uncued target) repeated measures ANOVA was performed on the
first look latencies toward the target. No effect or interaction were
significant, all p > .10. Hence, contrary to our predictions, no cue
facilitation effect was observed at the level of gaze latency.
Proportion of orienting to the cued and uncued targets
Table 2 displays the mean proportion of gaze orienting towards the
cued and the uncued targets, as a function of the preceding cue.
A 2 (Cue) 2 (Gaze direction) repeated measures ANOVA was
performed on the proportion of orienting toward the targets. This
analysis revealed a main effect of Gaze direction, F(1, 18) ¼ 9.43,
p ¼ .007, partial 2 ¼ .34: infants’ first look was more often
directed toward the cued than toward the uncued target (in 59%
vs. 41% of the trials, SD ¼ 12.7). In addition, the interaction
between Gaze direction and Cue was also significant, F(1, 18) ¼
4.91, p ¼ .04, partial 2 ¼ .21. Bonferroni-adjusted comparisons
revealed that these proportions differed as a function of the preced-
ing cue: When flower cues were presented, the proportion of first
gaze oriented toward the cued target was significantly higher than
the frequency of first gaze oriented toward the uncued target, t(18)
¼ 4.694, p < .001; this was not the case when snake cues were
presented, t < 1. Moreover, although infants’ first looks were
directed toward the cued target in 63.7% of the trials in which a
flower cue was presented (SD ¼ 12.6), this proportion dropped to
54.1% of the trials in which a snake cue was presented (SD¼ 18.3),
p ¼ .04 (see Figure 2).
The mean difference between the proportion of first looks
directed to the cued target when flower and snake cues were pre-
sented did not correlate with age, r ¼ .222, p > .10.
In accordance with our predictions, the presentation of a snake
modulated the cue facilitation effects observed when flowers
were presented.
Discussion
Using a variant of the Posner’s cuing paradigm (Posner, 1980), we
investigated the existence of a threat-dependent functional link
between the “what” and the “where” visual subsystems in infancy.
Specifically, we examined whether and how spatial orienting is
influenced by the detection of snakes in the visual environment.
Table 1. Mean latencies of the first look to the target as a function of the
direction of this first look and of the type of cue presented just before.
Direction of first look
Cued target Uncued target
Flower cue 427 [391, 464] 437 [402, 472]
Snake cue 414 [366, 462] 456 [410, 502]
Note. n ¼ 19. 95% CIs are in brackets.
Table 2. Mean percentages of gaze orienting towards the cued and the
uncued targets as a function of the type of cue presented before.
Direction of first look
Cued target Uncued target
Flower cue 63.7 [57.6, 69.8] 36.3 [30.2, 42.5]
Snake cue 54.1 [45.3, 62.9] 45.9 [37.0, 54.7]
Note. n ¼ 19. 95% CIs are in brackets.
Figure 2. Proportion of orienting toward the cued target separately for
threat-irrelevant (flower cues) and threat-relevant trials (snake cues).
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We observed that, when presented with peripheral cues, 7–11-
month-old infants turned more quickly towards snakes than flow-
ers. These findings add to the body of evidence showing attentional
capture by pictures of snakes in infancy (DeLoache & LoBue,
2009; LoBue & DeLoache, 2010). They also extend these results
by demonstrating that this grabbing of attention occurs under
different presentation conditions. Specifically, although previous
studies used pairs of pictures made up of one threat-relevant and
one threat-irrelevant pictures (i.e., competing for attentional
resources), pictures were presented in isolation in the current
study and elicited exogenous overt attentional shifts towards their
peripheral location, be they flowers or snakes. The present results
thus show that the detection of a snake in the visual periphery
would speed up the automatic engagement of attention towards its
location.
In addition to these effects on attentional capture, central to the
current study is the finding that the presentation of peripheral
snake cues modulated spatial orienting towards the subsequent
bilateral targets. While infants oriented their first gaze preferen-
tially towards the cued than the uncued target after flower cues
(i.e., facilitation effects4), when cues were pictures of snakes,
infants oriented as much towards the cued than the uncued target
(i.e., no facilitation effect). Detecting a snake (an ability linked to
the “what” subsystem) would thus influence attentional orienting
in the visual space (relying on the “where” subsystem) in such a
way that subsequent stimuli would be differentially attended to
depending on their location.
Although at first sight it might seem counterintuitive that infants
orient less towards the cued location after having detected a threat-
relevant stimulus rather than a neutral one, this can be explained in
two ways. First, these data could reflect an avoidance reaction when
detecting a snake, so that attention would be automatically diverted
from that location. However, in that case one would have expected
that infants orient their attention preferentially towards the opposite
side of space. Rather, we observed that, when a snake was detected,
infants oriented their attention as much towards the cued than
towards the uncued location. This pattern of results is more com-
patible with an interpretation in terms of a broadening of attention.
Detecting the snake in the grass would force us to enlarge our
attentional focus in order to consider ways to escape from the threat
and check for the presence of other potential dangers in the vicinity
of the detected snake. This would lead to attention being directed as
much to the threat location as to other locations.
It is worth noting that these facilitation effects were observed
when considering the orienting behaviour as a dependent variable,
not when examining gaze latencies (though these data were in the
same direction). The absence of cuing effects on gaze latencies is
not an isolated phenomenon in infant studies (Harman et al., 1994).
In fact, these would not be an optimal dependent measure for
detecting differences between cued and uncued targets since infants
usually show slow and variable responses (Varga, Frick, Kapa, &
Dengler, 2010), even more so when SOAs are long. It may not be
surprising then that the threat-dependent functional link between
the “what” and “where” infants’ visual subsystems was not
observed at the level of gaze orienting latency. Further studies
should nevertheless confirm the lack of cuing effect on saccade
latencies in a larger group of infants.
Hence, together with studies in lab-reared monkeys (Shibasaki
& Kawai, 2009), the current and previous infant studies convin-
cingly demonstrate that no prior experience with snakes or knowl-
edge about the danger they may represent are required to show
attentional biases linked to pictures of snakes. Our results are there-
fore in line with the claim that primates would have an evolved bias
for the rapid detection of threat-relevant stimuli, and snakes in
particular. They are consistent with the Snake Detection Theory
positing that snake detection by the human visual system improved
through natural selection as these animals have been preying on
mammals for tens of millions of years (Isbell, 2006, 2009). They are
also in line with the proposal of an evolved, relatively encapsulated
fear module in the brain that would be selectively sensitive to and
automatically activated by evolutionary threat-relevant stimuli,
allowing their rapid detection (O¨hman & Mineka, 2001, 2003).
Although it is tempting to consider such biases as innate given that
they are present early in life, similar studies should be run in new-
borns (who truly have no experience of their visual world) before
any conclusion can be drawn.
What are the mechanisms underlying these biases in infancy?
While the threat value assigned to fear-relevant stimuli would be a
critical factor to activate the fear module in adults (O¨hman et al.,
2001), 7–11-month-old infants have likely not yet labelled snakes
as being threatening. This assumption is supported by the fact that
infants do not show any evidence of actual fear when exposed to
videos of moving snakes (DeLoache & LoBue, 2009; Thrasher &
LoBue, 2016). Most probably, in the current study, infants’ atten-
tion was rather captured by low-level visual features characterizing
snakes (LoBue, Rakison, & DeLoache, 2010; Rakison & Derringer,
2008). Natural selection would indeed have fostered the evolution
of the primates’ visual system such that it rapidly detects perceptual
features that are associated with phylogenetically threat-relevant
stimuli (Cave & Batty, 2006; Isbell, 2006, 2009). Accordingly, in
O¨hman’s model of fear activation, external stimuli would first pass
through a “features detector” module, which would automatically
and unconsciously detect threat based on simple perceptual features
(O¨hman, 1993). For snakes in particular, such a perceptual feature
would be their curvilinear, often coiled shape (LoBue, 2014; LoBue
& DeLoache, 2011). Snakes’ curvy shape would indeed determine
snake detection in children and adults, while their bright colora-
tion, specific natural backgrounds and facial traits would have no
impact (LoBue & DeLoache, 2011), at least under the conditions
and in the age ranges tested. What features drive this perceptual
bias in the first years of life remains unstudied. Still, it is possible
that the underlying mechanisms and specific features follow a
developmental trajectory. For instance, although the coiled shape
would be sufficient to elicit an attentional bias in toddlers and
adults, infants could be sensitive to a combination of features such
as curvy shape, bright colours and contrasts (three attributes of our
set of stimuli). Moreover, cognitive factors could play an increas-
ing role in the occurrence of the effects of snake features presen-
tation across development (for evidence in adults, see LoBue,
2014). Putting aside the threat value children will learn to assign
to snakes at one point in their development (probably after having
entered school), the mere familiarity with the stimuli, both threat-
relevant and threat-irrelevant, presented in these studies (acquired
through picture books for instance) could determine the occur-
rence of the bias. Further studies should carefully control these
parameters in order to determine which specific features infants
are sensitive to, and how their day-to-day experience might influ-
ence the occurrence of the bias.
In conclusion, the present study provides compelling evidence
that human infants are biased for the fast detection of snakes, and
that the connection between the “what” and “where” visual sub-
systems is efficient in 7–11-month-old infants for the processing of
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threat-relevant stimuli. Indeed, detecting snakes in their visual
environment modulates infants’ gaze behaviour, most probably
by enlarging their attentional focus. Further studies should confirm
the perceptual nature of this bias and aim at identifying the specific
features that are crucial for the detection of snakes and other evolu-
tionary threat-relevant stimuli.
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Notes
1. We considered this age range reasonable since previous studies
reported no age effect on the detection of threat-relevant stimuli
in this age group (DeLoache & LoBue, 2009; LoBue &
DeLoache, 2010; LoBue, Buss, Taber-Thomas, & Pe´rez-
Edgar, 2016).
2. Pilot testing showed that these stimuli durations were the most
suitable in order to foster overt attentional shifts to the cue and to
ensure that attention was back to the centre of the screen when
the bilateral target was presented.
3. Latencies to look at the cue and at the target were calculated
from the onset of the stimulus to the infant’s first look (i.e., first
saccade) toward it rather than to the infant’s first fixation on it.
This was indeed a purer measure of infant’s attentional orienting
from the centre of the screen to the peripheral stimulus given (1)
the use of video coding that prevents any precise information
about where (and when) exactly the baby is looking at, and given
(2) the fleetingness of the cue that had most of the time disap-
peared when the baby’s gaze reached its location.
4. One might wonder why we did not observe inhibition instead of
facilitation effects when emotionally neutral, threat-irrelevant
cues were presented. Indeed, the use of long SOAs and a central
stimulus between the cue and the target in order to disengage
attention from the location of the cue typically favour the occur-
rence of the Inhibition of Return phenomenon (IOR; Posner &
Cohen, 1984), namely the propensity to preferentially orient
towards uncued than cued (i.e., recently attended) targets. How-
ever, given the eccentricity of our cues (30), infants’ eye move-
ments were clearly multisaccadic, and it has been argued that
IOR occurs following cues to which single and accurate sac-
cades have been made (Butcher, Kalverboer, & Geuze, 1999;
Rafal, Calabresi, Brennan, & Sciolto, 1989). Moreover,
although long SOAs would favour inhibition over facilitation
effects, no IOR would be observed in infants for inter-trial inter-
vals (ITIs) beyond 3.5 seconds (Clohessy, Posner, Rothbart, &
Vecera, 1991). Clearly, ITIs exceeded this limit in our experi-
mental design. Hence, range of eccentricity and long ITIs could
be responsible (at least partially) for the absence of IOR in the
present study.
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